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I. INTRODUCTION
All prescription drugs cause side effects' and all are considered
toxic. 2 '"There is no such thing as absolute safety in drugs. There
are some drugs that are less liable to cause a harmful reaction than
others, but people die every year from drugs generally regarded as
innocuous."3 A conservative estimate 4 is that 3 to 5 percent of all
* Professor, former Associate Dean, Assistant Dean and Associate Professor,
Oklahoma City University School of Law.
1. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, PUB. No. (OS) 73-88, REPORT OF THE
SECRETARY'S COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 24 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMIvM'N].
2. 2 S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 9.7
(1981).
3. Hearings on Drug Safety Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernment Relations
of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1964)
(statement of George P. Larrick, Commissioner of FDA, 1961-1966) (emphasis
added); Merrill, Compensation for Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV.
1, 1 (1973).
4. Available data understates the number of actual injuries caused by drugs be-
cause reporting systems are erratic and incomplete. Merrill, supra note 3, at
4-5.
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hospital admissions result from adverse reactions to prescription
drugs.5 One study indicated that approximately 13 percent of all
patients have an adverse reaction to drugs during hospitalization.6
Furthermore, at least one million people suffer severe reactions
each year.7 A large number of adverse reactions are simply an "in-
evitable cost of the availability of prescription drugs."8 However, a
large number of prescription drug reactions are also caused by
medical negligence.9
In order to establish a primafacie case of medical negligence, a
plaintiff must establish that the doctor owed him a duty of care' 0
and that the doctor breached that duty, thereby causing the plain-
tiff's injuries." In most medical malpractice cases, the plaintiff
must introduce expert testimony to establish both the standard of
care that most doctors would have used under the same or similar
circumstances 12 (and, in many states, in the same or a similar lo-
5. Pruzan, Prescription Drug Liability in the Context of Washington Law, 9
GONZ. L. REV. 707, 708 (1974).
6. Averbach, Physician's Liability for Prescription Drugs, 34 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
535, 535 (1969). At least one study indicates that 30 percent of all hospitalized
patients experience at least one adverse drug reaction. 1 S. PEGALIS & H.
WACHSMAN, supra note 2, at § 1.9.
7. Merrill, supra note 3, at 3 n.7. This figure may be as high as three million. 1 S.
PEGALIS & H. WACHMAN, supra note 2, at § 1.9.
8. Merrill, supra note 3, at 2. "1111 health offers adventure; no one has a better
chance to live dangerously than the ill who must take... [the drug manufac-
turers'] medicine." Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products
and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 368 (1965).
9. It has been estimated that drug-related malpractice accounts for 10 percent of
all medical negligence cases. Hirsh, The Medicolegal Significance of the Pack-
age Insert, 1977 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 143, 143-44. In a random sample of medi-
cal hospital records, close to 15 percent of iatrogenic injuries were caused by
adverse drug reactions. REPORTS, STUDIEs, AND ANALYsIs DEP'T OF HEALTH,
EDUC., AND WELFARE, PUB. No. (OS) 73-89, APPENDIX REPORT OF SECRETARY'S
COMM'N ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 55 (1973). Iatrogenic injuries are those
caused by errors of omission or commission by physicians. Id. at 51.
10. The physician's duty ordinarily depends on the existence of a doctor-patient
relationship. See generally Hiser v. Randolph, 126 Ariz. 608, 617 P.2d 774
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901);
Hoover v. Williamson, 236 Md. 250, 203 A.2d 861 (1964). But see Molien v. Kai-
ser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 616 P.2d 813, 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980); Ren-
slow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). The existence
of the physician-patient relationship is not dependent upon payment for the
physician's services; the relationship arises once the physician undertakes to
treat the patient. Betesh v. United States, 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974); Rule
v. Cheeseman, 181 Kan. 957, 317 P.2d 472 (1957).
11. See generally A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAw ch. 2 (1978).
12. Riedisser v. Nelson, 111 Ariz. 542, 534 P.2d 1052 (1975); Haisenleder v. Reeder,
114 Mich. App. 258, 318 N.W.2d 634 (1982); Cornfeldt v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684
(Minn. 1977); Hart v. Steele, 416 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. 1967). See generally King, In
Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical Profession: The "Accepted Prac-
tice" Formula, 28 VAND. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
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cality),13 and that the defendant doctor deviated from the custom-
ary practice of his peers, thus causing the plaintiff's injuries.14
However, in prescription drug cases, where the doctor has devi-
ated from the clear and explicit instructions of the drug manufac-
turer, the doctor should be called upon to explain the reason for
that departure, rather than to show merely that he followed the
customary practice of other doctors. In addition, the expert testi-
mony requirement should be relaxed to assist the plaintiff in es-
tablishing aprimafacie case for a prescription drug injury caused
by a physician's misuse of the product, through reliance on the
drug manufacturer's recommendation.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE DRUG MANUFACTURERS'
RECOMMENDATION
All manufacturers are required to give adequate directions and
warnings for the safe use of their products.15 A drug manufacturer
has the same duty to warn as any other manufacturer and may be
held to be negligent16 or liable under product liability7 for its fail-
13. The "locality rule" is a creature of the United States courts and has no
equivalent in English jurisprudence. Fleming, Developments in the English
Law of Medical Liability, 12 VAD. L. REV. 633, 641 (1959). The locality rule
establishes that a doctor has the duty to exercise that degree of skill and care
ordinarily employed by members of his profession under similar circum-
stances and located in the same or a similar locality. The justification for the
locality rule was that it would be unfair to impose upon a small town doctor
the standards for a metropolitan doctor who has greater opportunities of
daily observation and more medical resources and facilities. Many jurisdic-
tions still adhere to some form of the locality rule. See, e.g., Kronke v. Daniel-
son, 108 Ariz. 400,499 P.2d 156 (1972); Lauro v. Travelers Ins. Co., 261 So. 2d 261
(La. Ct. App. 1972); Wentling v. Jenny, 206 Neb. 335, 293 N.W.2d 76 (1980);
Pharmaseal Labs., Inc. v. Goffe, 90 N.M. 753, 568 P.2d 589 (1977); Bronwell v.
Williams, 597 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533
(Utah 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2810 (1978).
The current trend is to apply a national standard of care, the care a rea-
sonably competent practitioner would use, acting in the same or similar cir-
cumstances, and to allow a jury to consider the availability of medical
resources and facilities. See, e.g., Shilkret v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp.
Ass'n, 276 Md. 187, 349 A.2d 245 (1975); Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass. 102, 235
N.E.2d 793 (1968); King v. Williams, 276 S.C. 478, 279 S.E.2d 618 (1981); Shier v.
Freedman, 58 Wis. 2d 269, 206 N.W.2d 166 (1973); OKLyA STAT. tit. 76, § 20.1
(Supp. 1983).
14. Plutshack v. University of Minn. Hosp., 316 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1982); Neese v.
Shawnee Medical Center Hosp., Inc., 626 P.2d 1327 (Okla. 1981); Denardo v.
Carneval, 297 Pa. Super. 484, 444 A.2d 135 (1982).
15. Barber v. General Elec. Co., 648 F.2d 1272 (10th Cir. 1981). See generally J.
BEASLEY, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS REQUIRE-
MENT ch. 16 (1981); W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 191 (1979).
16. Smith v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79,273 N.W.2d 476 (1979); Michael
v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 579 P.2d 183 (1978).
17. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Hamilton v. Hardy,
1984]
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ure to warn of known hazards connected with foreseeable uses of
its products.18 In the products liability context, prescription drugs,
which always carry a "medically recognizable risk" of injury, are
usually classified as "unavoidably unsafe products."' 9 However,
the overall public benefit derived from their use justifies the mar-
keting of the drugs. Therefore, as long as the drugs are accompa-
nied by proper warnings and directions, they are not considered
defective and the manufacturer is not strictly liable for injuries
caused by their use.20
The duty to warn extends to those persons the manufacturer
should reasonably expect to use or to be endangered by the prod-
uct.2 1 Although it is the patient who will ultimately use or be en-
dangered by a prescription drug, the manufacturer must warn the
prescribing practitioner, rather than the patient, because the prac-
titioner is the only party able to evaluate and balance the dangers
of the drug against the benefits of its use.22 A warning to the medi-
cal profession is considered to be the only effective means by
which a warning can protect the patient.23 Once the physician is
37 Colo. App. 375, 549 P.2d 1099 (1976); Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400,
421 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1979).
18. Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 332 A.2d 11 (1975); Smith v. United Gyp-
sum Co., 612 P.2d 251 (Okla. 1980).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965). "All consumers
of prescription drugs serve as guinea pigs for the pharmaceutical industry,
for every new drug remains basically 'experimental' even after it has been
approved for general use." Merrill, supra note 3, at 20.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1965).
21. Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 865 (1975); West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202 (Iowa
1972). See generally W. KMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 15, at § 202.
22. Dyer v. Best Pharmacal, 118 Ariz. 465, 577 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Love
v. Wolf, 226 Cal. App. 2d 378, 38 Cal. Rptr. 183 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Rich-
ards v. Upjohn Co., 95 N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 1192 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980). See gener-
ally J. BEASLEY, supra note 15, at § 202. The Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1976), defines a prescription drug as one
that "because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the
method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use, is not safe
for use except under [a physician's supervision]." 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1) (B)
(1976). Adequate information on proper use must be conveyed to the con-
sumer for over-the-counter drugs, or the physician in the case of prescription
drugs. 21 U.S.C. §§ 352-53 (1976).
23. Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Dunn v. Lederle Labs.,
121 Mich. App. 73, 328 N.W.2d 576 (1982). The manufacturer's warning to the
doctor is considered effective, except where a vaccine is dispensed at mass
clinics, when there is no physician balancing the individual patient's risks,
Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Cunningham v.
Charles Pfizer Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1974); and except in the case of oral
contraceptives. 21 C.F.R. § 310.501(a) (1983). In both of these instances, the
warning must be given directly to the patient in order to be effective.
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warned, the duty to use the drug properly and to explain any risks
to the patient is incumbent upon the physician.24
Inasmuch as the drug manufacturer's duty to warn is directed
toward the physician, most of the litigation against manufacturers
for injuries caused by prescription drugs deals with the adequacy
of the warnings given to the medical profession.2 5
The duty of the ethical drug manufacturer to warn extends, then, to all
members of the medical profession who come into contact with the patient
in a decision-making capacity. To satisfy the duty, the manufacturer must
utilize methods of warning which will be reasonably effective, taking into
account both the seriousness of the drug's adverse effects and the difficul-
ties inherent in bringing such information to the attention of a group as
large and diverse as the medical profession .... The warning should be
sufficient to apprise the general practitioner as well as the "unusually so-
phisticated medical man" of the dangerous propensities of the drug...
In shor "it is incumbent upon the manufacturer to bring the warning
home to the doctor.'C
6
The drug manufacturer's duty is a continuous one; the manu-
facturer must keep testing the product and notify the medical pro-
fession of any newly discovered side effects from the drug's use.27
24. Dyer v. Best Pharmacal, 118 Ariz. 465, 577 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978); Mc-
Kee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21 (Okla. 1982). See generally 2 S. PEGALIS & H.
WAcHsMAN, supra note 2, at § 9.14. Although the drug manufacturer may be
held liable under a products liability theory for any injuries related to use of
the drug, physicians, who indirectly supply the patient with the drug, are gen-
erally exempt from the doctrine of products liability because the essence of
the transaction is considered a professional service, rather than a sale of
goods. See, e.g., Barton v. Owen, 71 Cal. App. 3d 484, 139 Cal. Rptr. 494 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1977); Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 187 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d
539 (Hudson County Ct. 1967), afOd, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968), affd, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969); Hoven v. Kel-
ble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977). Recent cases are beginning to sug-
gest that providers of medical care should be held strictly liable when
patients are injured by a defective product. See, e.g., Grubb v. Albert Ein-
stein Medical Center, 255 Pa. Super. 381, 387 A.2d 480 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)
(hospital held to strict liability).
25. See, e.g., Love v. Wolf, 249 Cal. App. 2d 822, 58 Cal. Rptr. 42 (Cal. Ct. App.
1967); Richards v. Upjohn Co., 95 N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 1192 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980);
McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 528 P.2d 522 (1974); Incol-
lingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971); Merrill, supra note 3, at 40-49;
Pruzan, supra note 5, at 708-09 nn.7-9. See generally Keeton, Products Liabil-
ity-Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. REv. 131 (1972); Rheingold, Products
Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturers's Liability, 18 RUTGERS L. REV.
947 (1964).
26. McEwen v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 270 Or. 375, 388, 528 P.2d 522, 529
(1974) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Accord Richards v. Upjohn Co.,
95 N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 1192 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980).
27. Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958); Baker v. St. Agnes
Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400,421 N.Y.S.2d 81 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); 21 C.F.R. §§ 310.300-
.301, 314.8 (1983). See generally W. KmmLE & R. LESHER, supra note 15, at
§ 205.
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The notification of any new dangers associated with a drug must
call specific attention to the danger and must reach the doctor
promptly.28 If necessary, the drug manufacturer has the duty to
send individual letters, commonly called "Dear Doctor Letters," to
all practicing physicians in order to warn of newly discovered side
effects, or of contraindications associated with the use of an estab-
lished drug.2 9 The drug manufacturer's stringent burden under
products liability law helps to ensure that physicians will receive
complete and accurate information before they prescribe drugs.
A proper warning is useless unless it is read and followed by
the physician. The law of products liability acknowledges this fact
and provides that where a "warning is given, the seller may rea-
sonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product
bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not
in a defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous." 30 Fur-
thermore, under products liability law, failure to follow adequate
instructions is considered misuse which bars a plaintiff's recov-
ery.31 The caselaw regarding the sufficiency of warnings on pre-
scription drugs certainly indicates that the physician has the duty
to read the drug manufacturer's warnings and to adhere to them
under most circumstances. Indeed, it has been argued that a doc-
tor who does not follow the recommendations has misused the
product; and that such misuse is an intervening cause which re-
lieves manufacturers from liability for the patient's injuries.32
In addition to the multitude of products liability cases which
indicate that a physician has the duty to follow the manufacturer's
recommendations, the substantial federal control exercised over
the marketing of drugs also indicates that the physician has such a
28. Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 406, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85-86 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1979).
29. Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159 (D.S.D. 1967), affd, 408 F.2d 978
(8th Cir. 1969); Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1979).
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965).
31. Pinto v. Clairol, Inc., 324 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1963); Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co. v.
Langley, 422 S.W.2d 773 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). See generally W. KnvImBLE & R.
LESHER, supra note 15, at § 198.
32. See, e.g., Dunn v. Lederle Lab., 121 Mich. App. 73, 328 N.W.2d 576 (1982). "Cau-
sation is broken between the manufacturer and patient when the doctor dis-
regards warnings." Dyer v. Best Pharmacal, 118 Ariz. 465, 468, 577 P.2d 1084,
1087 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978). "[A] drug manufacturer cannot be required legally
to foresee that a licensed physician will disregard express warnings regard-
ing a drug's use." Id. at 469, 577 P.2d at 1088. However, a doctor's negligence
in failing to consult the most recent literature on a drug's use has been con-
sidered foreseeable. Where the physician's negligence is foreseeable, a court
may find that it is not an intervening cause sufficient to cut off the manufac-
turer's liability. See, e.g., Richards v. Upjohn Co., 95 N.M. 675, 625 P.2d 1192
(N.M. Ct. App. 1980); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971).
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duty.3 3 Since 1938, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
had the authority to forbid the marketing of any unsafe drug.34 In
1961, the FDA gained additional power to ensure that drugs were
effective, as well as safe, when used as recommended. 35 Prior to
marketing, any new drug has to be approved by the FDA. Further-
more, the New Drug Application (NDA) must demonstrate the
safety of the drug by adequate testing and prove by "substantial
evidence" that the drug will have the claimed effect.3 6 "Substan-
tial evidence" is defined as:
evidence consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, includ-
ing clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training and
experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved, on the basis
of which it could fairly and responsibly be concluded by such experts that
the drug will have the effect it purports or is represented to have .... 37
Although the drug manufacturer is responsible for the actual
testing of all new drugs, the FDA enumerates the types of tests
which must be performed before any new drug may be approved.38
The FDA, therefore, acts as an overseer to ensure that there is sci-
entific proof in support of the safety and efficacy of any new drug.39
In 1961, the FDA also promulgated the "full disclosure" regula-
tion, which requires proper labeling of a prescription drug through
package inserts.40 According to the regulation, the package insert
must contain:
adequate information for [the drug's] use, including indications, effects,
dosages, routes, methods, and frequency and duration of administration,
and any relevant hazards, contraindications, side effects, and precautions
under which practitioners licensed by law to administer the drug can use
the drug safely and for the purposes for which it is intended .... 41
The package insert is actually prepared by the drug manufacturer
33. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-92 (1976); Comment, The Food and Drug Administration:
Law, Science and Politics in Evaluation and Control of New Drug Technol-
ogy, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 858 (1973); Comment, Package Inserts for Prescription
Drugs as Evidence in Medical Malpractice Suits, 44 U. CHL I REV. 398, 405-18
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence].
34. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1) (1976); Merrill, supra note 3, at 8.
35. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (5) (1976); Pruzan, supra note 5, at 711. The Supreme Court
has upheld the FDA's authority to issue regulations. Weinberger v. Hynson,
Westcott & Dunning, 412 U.S. 609 (1973); Ciba Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S.
640 (1973); Weinberger v. Pharmaceuticals, 412 U.S. 645 (1973); USV Pharma-
ceutical Corp. v. Weinberger, 412 U.S. 655 (1973).
36. 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1976); Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33,
at 409.
37. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (6) (1976).
38. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1976); 21 C.F.R. § 314.1 (1983); Merrill, supra note 3, at 8.
39. See 2 S. PEGALJS & H. WACHSMAN, supra note 2, at § 9.12.
40. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100 (1983); Averbach, supra note 6, at 549.
41. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(c) (1) (1983).
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as part of the NDA,42 however, the FDA must approve the scope
and accuracy of the information provided in the insert prior to re-
lease of the new pharmaceutical. 43 Therefore, the final insert is a
product of negotiations between the drug manufacturer and the
FDA.44 "The FDA considers the insert to have a twofold purpose:
to alert physicians to the conditions under which the drug is
deemed safe and effective; and to limit the claims a manufacturer
can make about the drug product."45 If after a drug has been ap-
proved for marketing, new information is received which indicates
adverse reactions, the FDA may withdraw approval or demand
that the manufacturer revise the insert.4 This continuous duty to
update and warn of newly discovered dangers and contraindica-
tions requires performance at "the earliest possible time."47
Considering the regulatory controls, the physician may justifia-
bly rely on the drug manufacturer to provide adequate information
for the safe use of the drug. "[T] he FDA considers the package
insert authoritative, [and] it considers that to mean that the insert
is medically sound. The FDA wants the physician and patient to
know that the package insert is backed by substantial evidence
and that they can believe what they read in the insert."48
Although the package insert is actually sent with the product to
the pharmacist, doctors have access to inserts through the Physi-
cian's Desk Reference (PDR),49 a source which reprints most pack-
age inserts.5 0 The PDR is published annually and each licensed
physician receives a complimentary copy.S1 Ninety-seven percent
of all doctors use the PDR as a reference for the safe use of drugs.52
Indeed, the federal regulations on full disclosure grew, in part,
out of the informational needs of doctors. 53 Due to the vast
number of drugs marketed and the multitude of medical articles
42. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (6) (1976); Sagall, The Drug Package Insert, 7 TRIAL, Mar.-
Apr. 1971, at 59.
43. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1976); Sagall, supra note 42, at 59.
44. Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 410.
45. Hirsh, supra note 9, at 145.
46. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (1976); Averbach, supra note 6, at 550; Comment, Package
Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 412.
47. 21 C.F.R. § 314.8(d) (1983); Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra
note 33, at 412.
48. Hirsh, supra note 9, at 148.
49. MEDICAL ECONOMICS, INC., THE PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE (1983).
50. See Sagall, supra note 42, at 60.
51. Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 398 n.2.
52. Id. at 416 n.90. However, physicians consider medical journals a more relia-
ble source of information. Id.
53. Hirsh, supra note 9, at 144.
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written on the use of prescription drugs,5 4 the practitioner simply
does not have the time to keep apprised of the developments con-
cerning all drugs.55 No single doctor could possibly be proficient in
the handling of all prescription drugs.
There are about 12,000 different drugs on the market; none are completely
safe and all have potential side effects, some minor and some major. Yet
any licensed doctor is free to prescribe any drug in any way, regardless of
the extent of his training or how diligently he keeps his knowledge up-to-
date.5 6
Clearly, the drug manufacturer's recommendation must be the
starting point for determining the proper standard of care required
of physicians in the administration of prescription drugs.
57
There are an increasing number of gross medical errors in administer-
ing a drug or where there has been a failure to exercise proper precau-
tions. Drug toxicity is all too common where directions for use are
followed to the letter without regard to the individuality of the patient. It
is almost inevitable when such instructions are disregarded.5 8
In any case involving the negligence of a physician for prescribing
a drug, the preliminary inquiry should be first what the manufac-
turer recommended regarding the use of the drug; and, then
whether the doctor followed that recommendation. A physician's
reliance upon the drug manufacturer's recommendations by way
of the package insert or the PDR is justified for three reasons:
(1) the recommendations must provide complete and accurate in-
formation for safe use to enable the manufacturer to avoid civil lia-
bility; (2) the manufacturer must comply with the federal
regulations to avoid the potential economic burden it could incur if
the FDA withdrew approval of the drug for marketing; and (3) doc-
tors out of necessity do, in fact, rely on the package insert and the
54. It is estimated that, the medical profession writes over 200,000 articles on the
use of drugs each year. Averbach, supra note 6, at 537 n.7.
55. Id. at 537.
56. 1 S. PEGAlis & H. WACHSMAN, supra note 2, at § 1.9. "[A] medical colleague
has suggested that physicians should be licensed like pilots-restricted in the
drugs they could prescribe, based on their education, training, and, presuma-
bly, competence." Merrill, supra note 3, at 111.
57. See, e.g., Dyer v. Best Pharmacal, 118 Ariz. 465, 468, 577 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1978) (doctor's disregard of the manufacturer's express warnings
was unforeseeable); Cambell v. Preston, 379 S.W.2d 557, 561 (Mo. 1964) (doc-
tor's alleged negligence was failure to follow the package insert); Baker v. St.
Agnes Hosp., 70 A.D.2d 400, 405, 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (1979) (standards of com-
petent medical practice require that doctors obtain knowledge of the drug
from the manufacturer before administering it); Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366,
376, 158 S.E.2d 548, 556-57 (1968) (package insert is evidence of a warning,
which the doctor disregards at his peril, and such disregard is relevant on the
issue of reasonable care).
58. Averbach, supra note 6, at 555; accord S. PEGAIis & IL WAcHsmAN, supra note
2, at § 9.7.
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PDR.59
Common sense would seem to indicate that the package insert
and the PDR should play significant roles in malpractice litigation.
Surprisingly, the courts' traditional question has been whether the
package insert or the PDR is admissible into evidence on the issue
of the physician's proper standard of care in prescribing drugs.60
I. THE PACKAGE INSERT AND THE HEARSAY RULE
Under the hearsay rule, the package insert traditionally re-
ceived the same treatment as a medical book and, as such, was
inadmissible to prove the truth of its contents. 61 The rule barring
admission of medical treatises was based on the rationale 62 that:
(1) the author was not under oath when the book was written;63
(2) the author could not be subjected to cross-examination;64
(3) medical science changed too rapidly for any book to be trust-
worthy;65 (4) the jury would misunderstand or misapply technical
language without the aid of expert testimony;66 and (5) the stan-
dard of care for physicians is based on the personal experience of
other physicians, rather than medical texts.67
In contrast, it is Professor Wigmore's view that, due to the trust-
worthiness of medical treatises and the necessity for their use at
trial, medical treatises should be admissible under an exception to
the hearsay rule.68 Use of the medical treatises as evidence often
becomes necessary because of the difficulty of obtaining expert
59. Merrill, supra note 3, at 104.
60. Id. at 54.
61. See, e.g., Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251 (Alaska 1975); Nolan v. Dillon, 261
Md. 516, 276 A.2d 36 (1971); Koury v. Follo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968);
Eckleberry v. Kaiser Found. Northern Hosp., 226 Or. 616, 359 P.2d 1090
(1961) (statute which allowed "books of science or art" to be admitted into
evidence did not apply to medical books); Webb v. Joins, 530 S.W.2d 847 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1975). See generally 2 S. GARD, JoNEs ON EVIDENCE § 12:31 (6th ed.
1972); 3 C. KRAMER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 29.06 (1982); Comment, Substan-
tive Admissibility of Learned Treatises and the Medical Malpractice Plaintiff,
71 Nw. U.L. REV. 678 (1976).
62. 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRiALs AT COMMON LAw § 1690 (1976).
63. See, e.g., Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 267 (Alaska 1975); Koury v. Follo, 272
N.C. 366, 376, 158 S.E.2d 548, 556 (1968).
64. See, e.g., Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 267 (Alaska 1975); Koury v. Follo, 272
N.C. 366, 376, 158 S.E.2d 548, 556 (1968); Webb v. Jons, 530 S.W.2d 847, 856
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975). See generally 2 S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, supra note
2, at § 11.8.
65. See, e.g., Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 267 (Alaska 1975); Koury v. Folo, 272
N.C. 366, 375, 158 S.E.2d 548, 555 (1968); 2 S. GARD, supra note 61, at § 12.31.
66. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, at § 1690.
67. See, e.g., Webb v. Jorns, 530 S.W.2d 847, 856 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); 6 J. WIG-
MORE, supra note 62, at § 1690.
68. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, at §§ 1691-92. See also Tittle v. Hurlbutt, 53 Ha-
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witnesses in the typical medical malpractice case.6 9 A medical text
is trustworthy because the author did not make the statement with
a view toward litigation and obviously could not have been biased
toward any of the parties to a lawsuit.70 A medical treatise is prob-
ably more accurate than the testimony of many expert witnesses. 71
"It must be conceded that those who write with no view to litiga-
tion are at least as trustworthy, though unsworn and unexamined,
as perhaps the greater portion of those who take the stand for a fee
from one of the litigants." 72 A few jurisdictions have adopted the
Wigmore position and do admit medical treatises as evidence of
the proper standard of care, as an exception to the hearsay rule.73
waii 526, 534, 497 P.2d 1354, 1359 (1972) (The court recognized the need for
wider use of medical texts as evidence.).
69. See, e.g., Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 267-68 (Alaska 1975); Winkjer v.
Herr, 277 N.W.2d 579, 589 (N.D. 1979); Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk Mutual
Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 76, 146 N.W.2d 505, 509 (1966). See generally Comment,
Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 426; Comment, supra note 61,
at 680. The Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice recommends
that organized medicine establish "an official policy encouraging members of
their profession to cooperate fully in medical malpractice actions so that jus-
tice will be assured for all parties; and the Commission encourages the estab-
lishment of pools from which expert witnesses can be drawn." REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY'S COMm'N, supra note 1, at 37.
70. See, e.g., Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 267 (Alaska 1975); Julien v. Barker,
75 Idaho 413, 423, 272 P.2d 718, 724 (1954). But see O'Brien v. Angley, 63 Ohio
St. 2d 159, 407 N.E.2d 490 (1980) (admission of an article was error because it
was written with a view toward litigation and lacked the requisite indicia of
objectivity and trustworthiness).
71. Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 267 (Alaska 1975).
72. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, at § 1692.
73. Alabama: Murdoch v. Thomas, 404 So. 2d 580, 585 (Ala. 1981) (party must
prove that the treatise was recognized as an authoritative one); Berry v. Rob-
ertson, 285 Ala. 623, 630-31, 235 So. 2d 657, 663 (1970) (a treatise recognized as
trustworthy is admissible); City of Dothan v. Hardy, 237 Ala. 603, 607, 188 So.
264, 265 (1939) (medical books ought to be received into evidence); Connecti-
cut: Cross v. Huttenlocher, 440 A.2d 952, 955 (1981) (treatise admissible
within trial court's discretion if recognized as authoritative and relevant);
Kansas: State v. McDonald, 222 Kan. 494, 495, 565 P.2d 267, 269 (1977) (state-
ments in treatises, offered to prove the truth of the matter stated therein,
exceptions to the hearsay rule and received in evidence); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 60-460(cc) (1976) (treatises admitted according to the Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence); Kentucky: Heilman v. Synder, 520 S.W.2d 321, 322 (Ky. 1975) (trea-
tises admitted according to the Uniform Rules of Evidence); Massachusetts:
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233, § 79C (West Supp. 1983-84) (statements in
treatise admissible as evidence to prove said facts, if relevant and the writer
recognized as an expert); Wisconsin: Halldin v. Peterson, 39 Wis. 2d 668, 674,
159 N.W.2d 738, 741 (1968) (plaintiff may establish the standard of care and
the doctor's breach thereof by medical texts); Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk
Mutual Ins., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 76, 146 N.W.2d 505, 509 (1966) (adopted the view of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, stating- "This is but another example of ac-
cepting the scientific process in the search for truth instead of reliance upon
the efficacy of an oath as a guaranty of trustworthiness."); WIs. STAT.
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Thus, the package insert or the PDR is admissible in those
jurisdictions.
Regardless of the admissibility of medical books in general,
there is further justification for admitting the PDR or package in-
sert as an exception to the hearsay rule.74 The author of the pack-
age insert-the manufacturer-must provide accurate and
complete information for the safe use of the drug both to avoid po-
tential civil liability75 and to comply with federal law.76 This duty
is a continuing one; unlike the author of a medical treatise, the
manufacturer must provide the most current information to the
practitioner.77 While medical books may become obsolete, the
package insert must be kept current. In addition, physicians do
rely heavily on the PDR or package inserts in the practice of
medicine. 78 The supervisory role of the FDA ensures the trustwor-
thiness of the drug manufacturer's recommendation and arguably
serves as a substitute for cross-examination of the manufacturer.79
Although the manufacturer is not technically under oath when he
writes the package insert, the federal regulations serve the func-
tion of an oath, ensuring the truthfulness and veracity of the NDA
and the package insert.80 Clearly, the package insert and the PDR
are more trustworthy than most medical books and should be ad-
mitted into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule, to prove
the standard of care, even in a jurisdiction which generally does
not admit medical treatises as evidence.
The recent trend is to follow this view by allowing the package
insert into evidence on some issues. Medical treatises have always
been admissible to impeach the credibility of an expert witness on
cross-examination.8 1 The Federal Rules of Evidence expanded
this view somewhat, and allow admission of medical treatises and
package inserts:
§ 908.03(18) (1975) (Uniform Rules). See also UNiF. R. Evm. 63(31) (1953) (A
medical treatise is not hearsay, when offered to prove the truth of the matter
stated therein, if the judge takes judicial notice, or an expert testifies, that the
source is a reliable authority.).
74. See Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 426-30.
75. See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text. See also Julien v. Barker, 75
Idaho 413, 423, 272 P.2d 718, 724 (1954).
76. See supra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
77. See supra notes 27-29 & 46-47 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
79. See Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 422-26.
80. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (Supp. II 1978); 21 C.F.R. §§ 202.1(e) (3), 314.9, 314.110(4),
314.111,314.115(b) (1), (b)(3)-(4) (1983).
81. See, e.g., Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 267-68 (Alaska 1975); Stanek v.
Bergeon, 89 Mich. App. 283, 286, 279 N.W.2d 296, 297 (1979); Dinner v. Thorp, 54
Wash. 2d 90, 93, 338 P.2d 137, 141-42 (1959). See generally 2 S. GARD, supra
note 61, at § 12:32; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, at § 1700.
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[T] o the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-
examination or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements con-
tained in published treatises ... or pamphlets on a subject of ...
medicine ... established as a reliable authority by the testimony or...
by judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence
but may not be received as exhibits.8 2
Although these two rules would seem to provide for broad ad-
missibility of package inserts, both the Federal Rules and the com-
mon law rule, which allows the use of the manufacturer's
recommendation for impeachment purposes, may be circum-
vented if an expert refuses to concede that the package insert is
valid "authority."83 "On cross-examination without the admission
by the medical expert... that he honored and accepted the rec-
ommendations of the manufacturer as 'authority'. . .the manufac-
turer's recommendation could never qualify as an exception to the
general rule which excludes hearsay .... 8"4Furthermore, both
rules downplay the significance of the drug manufacturer's recom-
mendation as the starting point for good medical treatment in pre-
scribing or administering drugs.8 5
Some courts have refused to acknowledge that a package insert
should be introduced to show the proper standard of care,86 yet
have admitted the insert to show that the physician knew or
should have known of its contents.87 In Koury v. Follo,88 the de-
fendant administered injections of Strep-Combiotic to plaintiffs
82. FED. R. Evin. § 803(18) (1975). For a listing of the states that have adopted
the federal rules, see 2 S. PEGALis & H. WACHSMAN, supra note 2, at § 11.18
n.19; 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, § 1693 n.6 (Supp. 1983). For a general dis-
cussion of the use of medical treatises under the federal rules, see Comment,
supra note 61.
83. See, e.g., Webb v. Jorns, 530 S.W.2d 847, 856-57 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
84. Id. Maggipinto v. Reichman, 481 F. Supp. 547 (E.D. Pa.), remanded, 607 F.2d
621 (3d Cir. 1979). The Maggipinto case was remanded to determine whether
the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because the plaintiff
had failed to introduce expert testimony to support her claim of dental mal-
practice. The plaintiff had used two medical treatises to impeach the testi-
mony of the defendant dentist; however, the defendant refused to
acknowledge them as reliable authority. Because the treatises were never
shown to be "reliable sources" under the federal rules, they were used solely
for impeachment purposes, and not as substantive evidence of the proper
standard of care. The motion to dismiss was proper for lack of substantive
evidence on the negligence claim. The court noted that "the Federal Rules of
Evidence clearly placed the burden of showing that the treatises fit within
Rule 803 (18) squarely on the plaintiff ... to establish to the satisfaction of
the Court that the treatise is 'reliable authority'. . . ." Id. at 550.
85. Comment, Evidentiary Aspects of Manufacturer Recommendations in Estab-
lishing Physicians' Standard of Care, 31 ARK. L. RE V. 477, 482 (1977).
86. See supra note 48-60 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 139-40, 167 A.2d 625, 631 (1961);
Koury v. Folio, 272 N.C. 366, 376, 158 S.E.2d 548, 556 (1968).
88. 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968).
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infant daughter despite the manufacturer's recommendation that
the drug was "not for pediatric use."89 The drug caused the daugh-
ter to become deaf.90 The court acknowledged that the recommen-
dation was inadmissible hearsay as offered to prove the truth of
the statement "not for pediatric use."9 1 However, it was admissi-
ble to show that the defendant doctor should have been aware of
the danger.92 This holding begs the question; if the defendant
should know of the danger why is he not required to act in accord-
ance with such knowledge? In Koury, this rationale would have
established the standard that the defendant should not prescribe
the drug for infants, as recommended by the manufacturer.
When the recommendation is introduced as proof of the doc-
tor's knowledge of its contents, the plaintiff still must introduce ex-
pert testimony to establish both the standard of care the defendant
doctor should have used and the fact that he departed from that
standard. For example, in Sharpe v. Pugh,93 the defendant doctor
prescribed the drug chloromycetin three times over a seven-month
period to two-year old Brenda for viral infections.94 The package
insert stated that aplastic anemia could occur after the administra-
tion of chloromycetin, that the drug should not be used where
other less dangerous drugs would be effective, and that it was "es-
sential that adequate blood studies be made during treatment."9 5
Brenda died from aplastic anemia.96 No blood tests were adminis-
89. Id. at 376, 158 S.E.2d at 550.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 382, 158 S.E.2d at 556.
92. Id. ("It is evidence of a warning which the physician disregards at his peril.")
In Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961), the defendant dentist
injected an anesthetic solution containing Epinephrine, preparing to fill the
patient's tooth. The drug manufacturer's recommendation provided that Epi-
nephrine was contraindicated if the patient suffered from high blood pres-
sure because the drug would raise the patient's blood pressure and could
cause a stroke in hypertensive patients. The patient had high blood pressure
and suffered a stroke from the injection. Id. at 132, 167 A-2d at 627. The rec-
ommendation was inadmissible on the standard of care required of the den-
tist. Id. at 139, 167 A.2d at 631. However, the package insert was evidence that
the dentist had notice that Epinephrine might be harmful to hypertensive
patients. Id.
93. 21 N.C. App. 110, 203 S.E.2d 330, aftd, 286 N.C. 209, 209 S.E.2d 456 (1974) (The
Supreme Court was equally divided. Under North Carolina court rules, when
this occurs, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed. Any legal
issues so decided do not become precedent for future cases.).
94. Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C. App. 110, 111, 203 S.E.2d 330, 331 (1974). Chloromyce-
tin was to be used for bacterial infections only, not viral infections. Id. at 115,
203 S.E.2d at 333. In 1973, 95 percent of patients with a common cold received
prescriptions, one-half of which were for antibiotics, which cannot kill cold
viruses. 1 S. PEGALIS & H. WAcHsmAN, supra note 2, at § 1.9.
95. Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C. App. 110, 113, 203 S.E.2d 330, 332-33 (1974).
96. Id. at 112, 203 S.E.2d at 332. Aplastic anemia is caused by deficient red cell
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tered until the seventh month of treatment.97 Although the insert
was admissible as to whether the doctor knew of its contents, 98 the
directed verdict against the plaintiff was upheld because there was
no expert testimony to establish the proper standard of care.99
Assuming, arguendo, that [the package inserts] were admissible to show
that defendant knew, or should have known, of the dangerous propensi-
ties of chloromycetin, we are of the opinion that there was a complete lack
of evidence to establish the standard of care which defendant was re-
quired to adhere to .... 100
In light of the drug manufacturer's specific recommendation, the
plaintiff should have been allowed, at least, to establish a prima
facie case on remand, which would have forced the defendant to
explain why he prescribed the powerful drug chloromycetin in the
first place and why he did not administer blood tests as recom-
mended. Under the circumstances of Sharpe v. Pugh, the require-
ment of expert testimony to show the standard of care was an
unnecessary burden, which prevented a decision on the merits.
Many courts have allowed the drug manufacturer's recommen-
dation into evidence to demonstrate the physician's proper stan-
dard of care in the administration or prescription of a drug,O' as an
exception to the rule against hearsay evidence. 02 These courts do
not consider the inserts determinative of the standard of care, but
rather evidence of that standard.
[The package insert] is not conclusive evidence of standard or accepted
practice in the use of the drug by physicians and surgeons, nor that a de-
parture from such directions is negligent. But it is prima facie proof of a
proper method of use, given by the maker, which must be presumed quali-
fied to give directions for its use and warnings of any danger inherent
therein.
1 0 3
production due to disorders of bone marrow. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL
DICTIONARY A-1O8 (14th ed. 1981).
97. Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C. App. 110, 111, 203 S.E.2d 330, 331 (1974).
98. Id. at 114, 203 S.E.2d at 333.
99. Id. at 115, 203 S.E.2d at 334. Accord Maggipinto v. Reichman, 481 F. Supp. 547
(E.D. Pa.), remanded, 607 F.2d 621 (3d Cir. 1979).
100. Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C. App. 110, 115, 203 S.E.2d 330, 333 (1974).
101. Chrestman v. Kendall, 247 Ark. 802, 448 S.W.2d 22 (1969); Salgo v. Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1957); Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 272 P.2d 718 (1954); Nolan v.
Dillon, 261 Md. 516,276 A.2d 36 (1971); Marchese v. Monaco, 52 N.J. Super. 474,
145 A.2d 809 (N.J. Super. Ct. Div. 1958), cert. denied, 28 N.J. 565, 147 A.2d 609
(1959); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406, 432 P.2d 250 (1967); Wasem v. Laskowski,
274 N.W.2d 219 (N.D. 1979); Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 8 S.E.2d 285 (1940).
See also Boucheron v. Tilley, 87 A.D.2d 983,450 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1982) (The court
indicated that the package insert would have been admissible if proper foun-
dational testimony had been given at trial.).
102. See, e.g., Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d
560, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957); Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 272
P.2d 718 (1954).
103. Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 423, 272 P.2d 718, 724 (1954).
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Certainly, this exception is a step in the right direction; how-
ever, there are still two obstacles that prevent a plaintiff from us-
ing the package insert effectively in a medical malpractice case.
First, the plaintiff must still introduce expert witnesses on the
proper standard of care,10 4 even if the expert only testifies that the
insert was the standard under the circumstances of the case.10 5
Thus, while [the package insert is] admissible, it cannot establish as a
matter of law the standard of care required of a physician in the use of the
drug. It may be considered by the jury along with the other evidence in
the case to determine whether the particular physician met the standard
of care required of him. The court's instruction on the subject should have
been limited to this effect. 106
Second, the defendant doctor can circumvent the mandate of
the package insert by offering expert testimony that doctors do not
rely on the manufacturer's recommendation as a determination of
proper medical treatment.10 7 In some instances, the doctor may be
104. See, e.g., Berry v. Robertson, 285 Ala. 623, 235 So. 2d 657 (1970); Chrestman v.
Kendall, 247 Ark. 802, 448 S.W.2d 22 (1969); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406, 432
P.2d 250 (1967). In Crouch v. Most, Crouch had received a rattlesnake bite on
his fingers. Dr. Most injected Antivenin into the finger despite the clear pro-
hibition in the package insert: "[d] o not inject the serum into a finger or toe."
Id. at 407, 432 P.2d at 251. The injection allegedly resulted in the amputation
of two of Crouch's fingers. Id. Despite the direct warning by the manufac-
turer and the defendant's acknowledgment that the warning was proof of a
proper method of use, the judgment in favor of Dr. Most was upheld because
the plaintiff failed to produce sufficient expert testimony on the standard of
care. Id. at 407-08, 432 P.2d at 254.
105. See, e.g., Nolan v. Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 534-35, 276 A.2d 36, 40, 46 (1971) (expert
testified that the package insert represented the standard of care followed by
physicians); Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 297, 8 S.E.2d 285, 290 (1940) (defend-
ant doctor testified that he followed the package insert's instructions; there-
fore, he was not prejudiced by the insert's introduction into evidence).
106. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 577,
317 P.2d 170, 180 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
107. In Haynes v. Baton Rouge Hosp., 298 So. 2d 149 (La. Ct. App. 1974), the court
held that there was a failure to demonstrate that the defendant doctor devi-
ated from the standard of care due his patient by prescribing the antibiotic
Kefiex, notwithstanding the drug company's literature warning that Keflex
had not been demonstrated to be effective against most forms of bacterial
infections. Id. at 155. The defendant doctor testified "you certainly don't
practice your medicine off a drug flyer." Id. at 153. The defendant doctor was
allowed throughout his testimony to downplay any warnings contained in a
drug manufacturer's recommendation. Id. In Brune v. Belinkoff, 354 Mass.
102, 235 N.E.2d 793 (1968), the plaintiff was administered eight milligrams of
pontocaine, a spinal anesthetic, instead of two to five milligrams, the dosage
recommended by the drug manufacturer. Id. at 103, 235 N.E.2d at 798. The
court upheld the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that failure to follow
the manufacturer's instruction was evidence of negligence. The court rea-
soned that it was "no more than a recommendation, and there was a differ-
ence of opinion among the anesthesiologists as to whether the failure to
follow it was improper practice." Id. at 103, 235 N.E.2d at 799. "[The plaintiffI
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justified in disregarding a package insert. However, it is simply un-
acceptable to allow the manufacturer's recommendation to be ig-
nored on the rationale that it is customarily disregarded by
physicians, in light of the fact that the usage and dosage instruc-
tions must be supported by sufficient scientific proof in order to
receive FDA approval.108 In these cases, the doctor should be
called upon to explain why he disregarded the express recommen-
dation of the drug manufacturer; he should not be allowed to hide
behind the shield of the expert testimony requirement or the cus-
tomary practice rule.
IV. USE OF THE PACKAGE INSERT TO ESTABLISH THE
STANDARD OF CARE
Once the package insert is admitted under an exception to the
hearsay rule, it remains to be determined under what circum-
stances the drug manufacturer's recommendation should establish
the physician's standard of care in the administration and pre-
scription of drugs. Traditionally, the recommendation has been al-
lowed to set the standard only if an expert testifies, or the
defendant doctor admits, that it should have been followed under
the facts of a particular case.109 However, a few courts have al-
lowed the package insert to establish the plaintiffs prima facie
case of negligence, without supporting expert testimony.
In the landmark decision of Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co.,11o the
Supreme Court of Minnesota held:
Where a drug manufacturer recommends to the medical profession
(1) the conditions under which its drug should be prescribed; (2) the dis-
orders it is designed to relieve; (3) the precautionary measures which
should be observed; and (4) warns of the dangers which are inherent in its
use, a doctor's deviation from such recommendations is prima facie evi-
dence of negligence if there is competent medical testimony that his pa-
tient's injury or death resulted from the doctor's failure to adhere to the
recommendations. Under such circumstances, it is incumbent on the doc-
tor to disclose his reasons for departing from the procedures recom-
mended by the manufacturer. Although it will ordinarily be a jury
frequently will be defeated by well-established professional customs that
courts refuse to scrutinize for reasonableness." Merrill, supra note 3, at 67.
108. See generally Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 432-
33, 443,449. Ninety-seven percent of all doctors do, in fact, rely heavily on the
drug manufacturer's recommendation. See supra note 52.
109. Chrestman v. Kendall, 247 Ark. 802, 809, 448 S.W.2d 22, 26 (1969); Nolan v. Dil-
lon, 261 Md. 516, 534-35, 540, 276 A.2d 36, 40, 46 (1971); Holloway v. Hawver, 22
Md. App. 303, 319, 322 A.2d 890, 898 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1974); Marchese v.
Monaco, 52 N.J. Super. 474, 487, 145 A.2d 809, 816 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1958), cert. denied, 28 N.J. 565, 147 A.2d 609 (1959); Holland v. Stacy, 496 P.2d
1180, 1183 (Okla. 1972); Webb v. Jorns, 530 S.W.2d 847, 856, 858 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975); Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 298, 8 S.E.2d 285, 290 (1970).
110. 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970).
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question whether the doctor has justified or excused his deviation, there
may be situations where as a matter of law the explanation exonerates
him unless rebutted by other competent medical testimony. 1 1 1
The court further explained the Mulder decision in Lhotka v. Lar-
son:1 1 2 "[u]nderlying Mulder is the self-evident premise that
deviation from a manufacturer's recommendations constitutes
prima facie evidence of negligence only when the conduct com-
plained of deviates from standards which are clear and explicit."" 3
The courts of South Dakotan14 and Illinois" 5 have also adopted the
position that deviation from the clear and explicit recommenda-
tions of the drug manufacturer establishes the plaintiff's primafa-
cie case.
It is an inherent weakness of Mulder and its progeny that virtu-
ally all prescription drugs and their accompanying package inserts
will meet the four-prong test to bring the primafacie evidence rule
into operation." 6 All drug manufacturer's recommendations must
contain precisely that information to comply with FDA require-
ments."17 From that standpoint, the Mulder test is overbroad.
However, Lhotka limited the test by adding the further require-
ment that the recommendation establish a clear and explicit stan-
dard.118 A court should consider the clear and explicit
requirement satisfied when a lay jury could conclude from the rec-
ommendation and the facts of the case that the doctor was negli-
gent. A standard of care is clear and explicit when the facts of the
case and the recommendation are such that the jury needs no fur-
ther expert testimony to assist them; the determination falls
within the jury's common knowledge.
In medical malpractice cases, expert testimony is needed un-
less res ipsa loquitur or the common knowledge rule applies." 9
111. Id. at 339-40, 181 N.W.2d 882, 887-88 (upon petition for rehearing). See also
Cornfeldt v. Togen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 703 (Minn. 1977).
112. 307 Minn. 121, 238 N.W.2d 870 (1976) (case discussed infra notes 137-42 and
accompanying text).
113. Id. at 127 n.14, 238 N.W.2d at 874 n.14 (1976).
114. Mueller v. Mueller, 88 S.D. 446, 221 N.W.2d 39 (1974) (facts discussed infra
note 136).
115. Ohligschlager v. Proctor Community Hosp., 55 1ll. 2d 411, 418, 303 N.E.2d 392,
396 (1973) (facts discussed infra note 136). Callan v. Nordland, 114 Ill. App. 3d
196, 448 N.E.2d 651 (1983) (Ohligschlager applied, and manufacturer's recom-
mendation for the drug the pharmacist actually supplied to the patient was
admissible, even though the doctor prescribed the drug by a generic name);
Spilotro v. Hugi, 93 Ill. App. 3d 837, 417 N.E.2d 1066 (1981) (recognized Oh-
ligschlager could be applied in a negligence action against a veterinarian);
Conrad v. Christ Community Hosp., 77 El. App. 3d 337, 395 N.E.2d 1158 (1979).
116. Merrill, supra note 3, at 64-65.
117. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
118. Lhotka v. Larson, 307 Minn. 121, 127 n.14, 238 N.W.2d 870, 874 n.14 (1976).
119. See generally Comment, Malpractice Actions Without Expert Medical Testi-
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The common knowledge rule applies when the physician's alleged
act of negligence falls within the general knowledge of a layperson
and, therefore, the standard of care and breach thereof need not be
established by expert testimony. 20 Although the common knowl-
edge rule generally is not applied in cases involving negligence in
the use of prescription drugs,12 ' it should be applied in combina-
tion with the drug manufacturer's recommendations to allow the
jury to determine negligence. 2 2 The common knowledge rule is a
further limitation on the Mulder decision. The physician's devia-
tion from the package insert is primafacie evidence of negligence
only if the common knowledge rule is also applied, otherwise, ex-
pert testimony would be required.
The North Dakota Supreme Court apparently adopts this ap-
proach. In Winkjer v. Herr, 23 the court stated:
Although plaintiff may be correct in his contention that the published
warnings and recommendations, combined with the common knowledge
doctrine, may have been sufficient to present a prima facie case of negli-
gence in the prescription of phospholine iodide for a diagnosis of ocular
hypertension, those are not the facts of this case. Rather, there was a pre-
scription for a condition diagnosed as glaucoma.
12 4
Even though few courts have specifically applied the common
knowledge rule, 25 the facts of most of the prescription negligence
cases support its application.
In Mulder, Dr. Mork prescribed chloromycetin for an ear infec-
tion on four occasions to Mrs. Mulder. 2 6 The manufacturer
mony, 20 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 43 (1971); Note, Evidence: Obvious Malpractice-
Expert Testimony Not Required, 13 WASHBuRN L.J. 238 (1974).
120. See generally Dahlquist, Common Knowledge in Medical Malpractice Litiga-
tion: A Diagnosis and Prescription, 14 PAc. L.J. 133 (1983).
121. See, e.g., Wasem v. Laskowski, 274 N.W.2d 219, 224-25 (N.D. 1979); Hundemer
v. Sisters of Charity of Cincinnati, Inc., 22 Ohio App. 2d 119, 124, 258 N.E.2d
611, 615 (1969). See generally Merrill, supra note 3, at 93.
122. Comment, supra note 85, at 481-82. See generally Comment, Package Inserts
as Evidence, supra note 33, at 450.
123. 277 N.W.2d 579 (N.D. 1979). The Winkjer decision was decided three months
after Wasem v. Laskowski, 274 N.W.2d 219 (N.D. 1979), wherein the court re-
jected a proposed jury instruction which was based on the Mulder primafa-
cie evidence rule; the court disapproved of the words "prima facie" as too
technical for the jury to understand. Id. at 222-23.
124. Winkjer v. Herr, 277 N.W.2d 579, 585 (N.D. 1979) (emphasis added).
125. In Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1961), the Supreme Court of
New Jersey held that the "doctrine of common knowledge combined with the
manufacturer's brochure, admitted into evidence, was sufficient to avoid a
dismissal." Id. at 143, 167 A.2d at 633. The insert put the doctor on notice of
the drug's risk to hypertensive patients, and it was within the jurors' common
knowledge that the doctor should find out whether a patient suffered high
blood pressure before administering the drug. Id. For a further description
of the case, see supra note 92.
126. Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 334, 181 N.W.2d 882, 884 (1970).
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warned that the drug should only be used for serious infections,
and that it should not be used if less dangerous drugs would be
effective.127 Additionally, the package insert warned that serious
or fatal blood disorders (aplastic anemia) could result.12 8 Mrs.
Mulder died from aplastic anemia.129 A lay juror's knowledge and
the manufacturer's express warnings, should require the defend-
ant to explain why he prescribed chloromycetin for an ear infec-
tion. Dr. Mork testified he was aware of the warning, but "chose
not to be governed by it."130 It was implicit in the court's ruling,
reversing the directed verdict in favor of Dr. Mork, that the lay jury
could properly find Dr. Mork negligent without the assistance of
expert testimony,131 based on its own knowledge and the package
insert.
Another case which illustrates that the facts must fall within
"common knowledge" before the package insert can establish the
standard of care is Marchese v. Monaco.132 Dr. Monaco prescribed
mycifradin to Mr. Marchese, who had impaired kidney func-
tions.133 The drug manufacturer warned that "[u] nder such condi-
tions the benefits that may be derived . . . should be weighed
against the possible developments of deafness." 3 4 Mr. Marchese
received numerous injections and, as a result, was rendered totally
deaf.135 Without an explanation from Dr. Monaco as to why he had
disregarded an express warning, the jury should have been able to
conclude, without the aid of expert testimony, that the drug was
improperly prescribed.136
127. Id. at 333-34, 181 N.W.2d 882, 884-85.
128. Id. For another case dealing with chloromycetin, see Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C.
App. 110, 203 S.E.2d 330 (1974) (discussed supra notes 93-100 and accompany-
ing text).
129. Mulder v. Park Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 334, 181 N.W.2d 882, 884 (1970).
130. Id. at 335, 181 N.W.2d at 885.
131. The court noted that the expert witnesses produced by the plaintiff were not
in active practice and emphasized physicians' reluctance to testify against
one another as the cause of the plaintiffs difficulty in obtaining qualified ex-
perts. Id. at 335, 181 N.W.2d at 885-86.
132. 52 N.J. Super. 474, 145 A.2d 809 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1958), cert. denied, 28
N.J. 565, 147 A.2d 609 (1959).
133. Id. at 484, 145 A.2d at 814.
134. Id. at 480, 145 A.2d at 813.
135. Id. at 485, 145 A.2d at 811.
136. There was, in fact, expert testimony that Dr. Monaco should have used a less
dangerous drug because Mr. Marchese's condition was not an "emergency."
Id. at 481, 484, 145 A.2d at 813, 816. The other cases that rely heavily on pack-
age inserts to establish the standard of care support the theory that the facts
must fall within the jury's common knowledge. See Ohligschlager v. Proctor
Community Hosp., 55 IM. 2d 411, 303 N.E.2d 392 (1973) (The doctor ordered
Sparine concentrations of 50 mg. and 75 mg. intravenously despite the manu-
facturer's warning that Sparine, when used intravenously, should be used in
a concentration no greater than 25 mg. The Sparine infiltrated the tissue of
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Many cases will require expert testimony to assist the jury be-
cause the jury simply could not understand the drug manufac-
turer's recommendation. In Lhotka v. Larson,137 the court held
that the Mulder test was inapplicable because the recommenda-
tion was not "clear and explicit."138 The manufacturer had warned
that Seconal (a sedative) should not be injected during a prema-
ture delivery' 39 and that the dosage should be reduced by 50 per-
cent if administered with Phenergan (an obstetrical sedative).140
In Lhotka, however, Seconal was administered orally, rather than
by injection, and was administered three hours before, rather than
with, Phenergan.141 A lay jury's common knowledge is not so so-
phisticated that it would comprehend the difference between ad-
ministering a drug orally or by injection, and the speed by which a
drug dissipates. In such a case, the drug manufacturer's recom-
mendation should not be sufficient to establish a primafacie case
and the plaintiff should be required to produce expert testimony to
explain the proper usage of the drug and whether the doctor's us-
age was improper.142
plaintiff's arm and, as a result, plaintiff had to undergo skin grafts.); Nolan v.
Dillon, 261 Md. 516, 276 A.2d 36 (1971) (Dr. Nolan injected 50 mg. of Sparine
intravenously. The ampule was clearly marked for "intramuscular use only."
The package insert stated that intravenously, the concentration should be no
more than 25 mg. Immediately after the injection, Mrs. Dillon's hand became
discolored and it became necessary to amputate two fingers.); Sanzari v. Ro-
senfeld, 34 N.J. 128, 167 A.2d 625 (1960) (case described supra notes 92, 125);
Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406, 432 P.2d 250 (1967) (case described supra note
104); Koury v. Folo, 272 N.C. 366, 158 S.E.2d 548 (1968) (case discussed supra
notes 88-92 and in accompanying text); Sharpe v. Pugh, 21 N.C. App. 110, 203
S.E.2d 330 (1974), affd, 286 N.C. 209, 209 S.E.2d 456 (1974) (case discussed
supra notes 93-100 and in accompanying text); Mueller v. Mueller, 88 S.D. 446,
221 N.W.2d 39 (1974) (Despite the manufacturer's express warnings, Dr.
Mueller administered cortisone to the plaintiff over a seven-year period. The
excessive and prolonged use of cortisone led to the deterioration of plaintiff's
bone structure and the eventual collapse of her right hip.).
137. 307 Minn. 121, 238 N.W.2d 870 (1976).
138. Id. at 127, 238 N.W.2d at 874-75.
139. Id. at 126, 238 N.W.2d at 874.
140. Id. The drugs administered to the mother allegedly crossed the placental
barrier and caused severe narcotic-induced respiratory depression. Id. at 125,
238 N.W.2d at 873. The child's condition was described as severe mental retar-
dation with spastic quadroparesis and cerebral palsy. Id. at 124,238 N.W.2d at
873.
141. Id. at 126, 238 N.W.2d at 874.
142. For other cases dealing with drug manufacturers' recommendations in which
the court should require expert testimony because the facts do not fall within
the jury's common knowledge, see Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (The
manufacturer of a dye (Urokon) used for translumbar aortographies, stated
that aortography should not be repeated within 24 hours. The defendant tes-
tified that the manufacturer's recommendation advised against only a second
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A rule which would allow the plaintiff to establish a primafacie
case of negligence against a physician who deviates from the ex-
press instructions or warnings of the manufacturer, as long as the
case fell within the common knowledge rule, would not necessarily
impose liability. There are still two barriers to recovery. First, the
plaintiff must still prove causation; that the physician's improper
use of the drug caused the plaintiff's injuries.143 Second, the doc-
tor can avoid liability by providing a reason for his departure from
the directions. For example, in Haynes v. Baton Rouge General
Hospital,14 4 Mrs. Haynes had undergone surgery for a fractured
hip.145 After surgery, Dr. Stander prescribed Keflex, an antibiotic,
for Mrs. Haynes' bacterial infection.146 The package insert pro-
vided that Keflex was not effective against most strains of bacte-
ria.147 The improper choice of medication allegedly prolonged Mrs.
Haynes' recovery. Dr. Stander deviated from the express recom-
mendations and the facts fall within the jury's common knowledge,
therefore, Mrs. Haynes should be allowed, under the theory es-
poused, to establish her prima facie case without the aid of expert
testimony. Under this analysis it would then be incumbent upon
Dr. Stander to disclose why he departed from the warning. Al-
though Keflex was not effective against most bacteria, Dr. Stander
had tested Keflex against the particular strain of bacteria that had
infected Mrs. Haynes and the laboratory reports showed that
Keflex was effective in this case.148 Dr. Stander justified his depar-
insertion of the needle, not two administrations with the needle left in place
within the patient. Although the manufacturer stated 10 to 15 cc. of Urokon
was adequate, 50 cc. was recommended in another procedure. Expert testi-
mony was, therefore, required to establish that the defendant's use of 50 cc.
in a total of two injections was improper.); Holland v. Stacy, 496 P.2d 1180
(Okla. 1972) (Plaintiff was hospitalized with gangrenous toes and the defend-
ant administered Roniacol, a drug that should not be used if a patient has
high blood pressure. The plaintiff had a cerebral vascular lesion of thrombo-
sis type. The plaintiff became totally blind after taking the Roniacol. Recov-
ery was properly denied because there was no expert testimony that the
plaintiff's disease was covered by the manufacturer's warning and that possi-
bility was not within the jury's common knowledge.).
143. See, e.g., Lhotka v. Larson, 307 Minn. 121, 238 N.W.2d 870 (1976) (There were
six possible causes of the child's injuries in addition to the doctor's alleged
negligence. Recovery was denied.); Crouch v. Most, 78 N.M. 406, 432 P.2d 250
(1967) (For a description of the facts, see supra note 104. Recovery was de-
nied because either the rattlesnake bite or the injection could have caused
the tissue to die.); Reed v. Church, 175 Va. 284, 8 S.E.2d 285 (1970) (Plaintiff's
condition, incurable syphilis, could have caused the plaintiffs blindness as
well as the medication.).
144. 298 So. 2d 149 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
145. Id. at 151.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 152.
148. Id. at 152-55.
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ture and the "explanation exonerate[d] him unless rebutted by
other competent medical testimony."149
This approach does shift the burden of explanation to the de-
fendant. However, shifting the burden and requiring the defend-
ant to exonerate himself is consistent with the current trend in tort
law. In many areas, the courts impose the burden of exoneration
upon the defendant to avoid injustice or to assist the plaintiff with
problems of proof.150 The suggested approach would also require
the defendant to explain his actions and prevent him from hiding
behind the customary practice rule. "A physician's conformity to
the custom of his local colleagues should be no defense in drug
cases; the issue should be whether the physician departed from
sensible pharmacology in his choice or administration of the
drug."151
In a few cases outside the prescription drug area, the courts
have held that a physician may be liable for malpractice even
when he complies with the custom of his profession.152 These
holdings are justified by the rationale that some practices may be
so negligent that a jury need not rely on expert testimony that the
practice deviates from customary practice; the misconduct falls
within the common knowledge rule. 5 3 Thus, customary practice is
149. Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 340, 181 N.W.2d 882, 887-88 (1970).
150. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Lab., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132
(1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20
Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3
Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970); Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d
80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948); Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944);
Anderson v. Somberg, 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975);
Fosgate v. Corona, 66 NJ. 268, 330 A.2d 355 (1974).
151. Merrill, supra note 3, at 111.
152. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 ll. 2d 326, 211
N.E.2d 253 (1965); Morgan v. Sheppard, 91 Ohio App. 579, 188 N.E.2d 808
(1963); Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974).
153. In the landmark decision of Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981
(1974), the plaintiff, 32 years of age, consulted the defendant for five years for
visual problems. In 1968, it was discovered that she had glaucoma and plain-
tiff had lost her peripheral vision. The defendant had failed to give the plain-
tiff the pressure test for glaucoma because it was not the custom of the
profession to administer the tests for patients under 40 years of age. Accord-
ingly, the trial court entered a judgment for the defendant. The Washington
Supreme Court held that "reasonable prudence" required the giving of the
pressure test, regardless of custom, because the test was simple, inexpensive,
harmless, and conclusive on the presence of glaucoma. Only one out of 25,000
people in plaintiffs age group had glaucoma. The court quoted with approval
T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932): "[I]n most cases reasonable pru-
dence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure...
Courts must in the end say what is required; there are precautions so impera-
tive that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission." Id.
(emphasis added by the Helling court). Note that the facts of Helling fall
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not determinative. The requirement that the doctor explain why
he departed from the manufacturer's express instructions and
warnings de-emphasizes customary practice. The jury focuses on
the facts of the particular case and on the doctor who has, in fact,
misused the product under the law of products liability.154 Doctors
should be held to the same standard in the use of prescription
drugs, as consumers in the use of non-toxic products: they should
read and heed warnings. If they depart from the instructions, doc-
tors should be prepared to give a medically-sound explanation for
that departure. 55
V. ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON
The medical profession has referred to evidentiary use of the
package insert to establish the standard of care as a "therapeutic
straight jacket."'56 Physicians claim that they rely primarily on
their own experience and literature published by their colleagues
to determine proper drug usage,157 rather than the conservative
and quickly outdated package inserts.158 The inserts are consid-
ered outdated from the standpoint that there are many medically-
sound uses for prescription drugs which are unapproved by the
FDA.'59 The inserts are considered overly-conservative since they
within the common knowledge rule and that a lay jury could conclude, with-
out expert testimony, that the custom was negligent. Helling was reaffirmed
in Gates v. Jensen, 92 Wash. 2d 246, 595 P.2d 919 (1979). See also Favolora v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 144 So. 2d 544 (La. Ct. App. 1962) (Plaintiff fell
during X-rays. The radiologist did not ask any questions and was not aware
that part of the plaintiffs complaint was dizzy spells. According to the cus-
tomary practice, taking the patient's history was not part of the radiologist's
responsibility. The court found the customary practice negligent.); Morgan v.
Sheppard, 91 Ohio App. 579, 188 N.E.2d 808 (1963) (Patient went into shock
following surgery. The surgeon did not visit the patient for 12 hours because
it was customary to deal with the problem by phone. Regardless of the cus-
tom the surgeon was liable for the death.).
154. See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. "The manufacturer of the drug
should be liable for all reactions that are not the result of the physician's
negligence, measured primarily by his deviation from the manufacturer's
warnings and instructions ... ." Merrill, supra note 3, at 107-08.
155. 2 S. PEGA LIS & H. WACHSMAN, supra note 2, at 9.12.
156. Hirsh, supra note 9, at 145.
157. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 576,
317 P.2d 170, 180 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957). Salgo is the only apparent case,
dealing with drug manufacturers' recommendations, which sets forth policy
arguments against their evidentiary use. Other cases in which the courts
deny admission focus on the fact that the package inserts are inadmissible
hearsay. See supra notes 60-67 & 81-102 and accompanying text.
158. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 576,
317 P.2d 170, 180 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
159. Comment, supra note 85, at 479, 491. In one survey 81 percent of the doctors
polled approved prescribing drugs for uses unapproved by the FDA- 7 per-
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are written by the manufacturer who must emphasize safeguards
in order to minimize its own civil liability. Manufacturers often
recommend frequent laboratory tests and clinical observation of
the patient.160 According to the medical profession, strict adher-
ence simply is not feasible, I61 nor is it wise. "[T]he miraculous
developments which have taken place in the effective use of antibi-
otics and other drugs might never have been accomplished if phy-
sicians were required to follow blindly the suggestions of the
manufacturers who prepare, but do not use them."'162 Additionally,
doctors fear that the jury will misinterpret, misapply, and misun-
derstand the inserts since they are written not for the lay person to
comprehend, but for physicians and pharmacists. 163
The medical profession's concerns are legitimate; however, the
profession overlooks the package insert's actual role in litigation
and improperly discredits the significance of the package insert. If
the package insert were introduced into evidence in every case of
alleged negligence in the use of prescription drugs, without the aid
of expert testimony, there certainly would be a potential for abuse
by the lay jury. However, unless the facts of a case and the drug
manufacturer's recommendations fall within the jury's common
knowledge, the package insert should not be sufficient to establish
aprimafacie case.164 If the facts and the package insert would not
allow a layperson to determine negligence, expert testimony
should be required. 165 Thus, the common knowledge rule will pre-
vent misuse of the package insert.
Furthermore, the admissibility of the package insert as evi-
dence of proper usage does not require doctors to practice "cook
book"166 medicine, nor does it require "blind adherence"'6 7 to the
drug manufacturer's recommendations. The physician definitely
cent stated they prescribed drugs frequently for unapproved uses, 38 percent
stated they sometimes did so, and 36 percent stated they seldom prescribed a
drug for a use not approved by the FDA. Id. at 479 n.1.
160. Sagall, supra note 42, at 59. Doctors believe that drug manufacturers place
excessive warnings in the package insert to avoid civil liability for failure to
warn of possible adverse reactions. Id.
161. Id. at 59. Part of the medical profession's negative reaction to the use of the
package inserts as evidence in medical malpractice cases may be caused, in
part, by a fear of government control over the profession through FDA regula-
tions. See generally Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at
415-18.
162. Salgo, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 576, 317 P.2d 170, 180 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
163. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 62, at § 1690; Comment, supra note 85, at 482; Com-
ment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 425.
164. See supra notes 116-142 and accompanying text.
165. Comment, supra note 85, at 482.
166. Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 425.
167. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 576,
317 P.2d 170, 180 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
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has more information regarding his patient's individual needs and
is in the best position to balance the risks of using the drug against
the particular patient's needs.168 The package insert is not meant
to substitute for the thoughtful and careful use of a drug by an
informed physician.169 A rule by which the insert is admitted into
evidence either as an exception to the rule against hearsay, or in
combination with the common knowledge rule, would not impose
absolute liability upon the physician for all injuries caused by de-
parture from the drug manufacturer's recommendations. 70 It
would require that the physician have a medically-sound reason
for that departure.'17 "[W]hen a physician prescribes a drug for a
use not in the approved labeling, he invokes two responsibilities.
One, he has to be well-informed about the drug, and two, base his
use of it on a firm scientific rationale and sound medical
studies."172
It is reasonable to impose a burden of exoneration upon the
doctor and allow the plaintiff to establish his primafacie case with
a package insert,173 since the doctor should know the reasons for
his departure and he should have better access to expert testi-
mony to support that departure,174 than would the plaintiff.175 If
supported by sound medical reasons, a doctor could still prescribe
a drug for an unapproved use, 76 and avoid civil liability. In any
event, the physician could avoid the potential of all civil liability by
simply requiring his patient to give "informed consent"'77 prior to
168. Merrill, supra note 3, at 104-05.
169. Id. at 53.
170. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
171. Hirsh, supra note 9, at 148; Comment, supra note 85, at 479.
172. Hirsh, supra note 9, at 146.
173. See supra notes 150-55 and accompanying text.
174. See Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 439.
175. Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 181 N.W.2d 882 (1970). "All too
frequently, and perhaps understandably, practicing physicians are reluctant
to testify against one another." Id. at 336, 181 N.W.2d at 885.
176. Hirsh, supra note 9, at 149.
177. Under the doctrine of informed consent, the doctor must disclose all "mate-
rial risks" which may affect the patient's decision whether to forego the pro-
posed therapy. If the doctor fails to disclose a material risk and the patient
would have declined treatment if he had known of the risk, the doctor is lia-
ble for the adverse consequences, if they do, in fact, occur. See, e.g., Canter-
bury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972);
Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Sard v.
Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554 (Okla.
1979). The doctrine of informed consent is based on the philosophy that
"[e] very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to deter-
mine what shall be done with his own body," Schloendorff v. Society of New
York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), and that "[t]rue consent to
what happens to one's self is the informed exercise of choice." Canterbury v.
Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See generally Katz, Informed Con-
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the administration of a drug for an unapproved use.17 8 'The best
defense a physician has is proof of complete informed patient
consent."1
79
Although physicians contend that they rely on their colleagues'
articles to determine proper drug usage, this reliance is arguably
misplaced, since the FDA has no jurisdiction over the authors of
articles to ensure that they are scientifically sound.180 The FDA
considers the package insert the best source of drug informa-
tion.181 The reliability of the insert is built into the preparation
process182 since the information contained within the insert must
be based on "substantial evidence" 8 3 to gain FDA approval. 84 In
fact, the busy medical practitioner has no alternative but to rely
heavily on the package insert or the PDR185 and to follow the direc-
tions and warnings carefully. 86 The drug manufacturer is "pre-
sumed qualified" to give directions on the use of its product, 87 and
sent-A Fairy Tale?, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv. 137 (1977); Plant, The Decline of "In-
formed Consent", 35 WAsH. & LEE L REv. 91 (1978); Shartsis, Informed
Consent: Some Problems Revisited, 51 NEB. L. REv. 527 (1972); Waltz &
Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 628 (1970). If
the package insert was admissible, it could be used to establish a material
risk, and the doctor's failure to disclose that risk could be used to prove a
breach of the doctor's duty to get informed consent.
178. See 2 S. PEGAUs & H1 WACHSMAN, supra note 2, at § 9.12; Hirsh, supra note 9,
at 149; Merrill, supra note 3, at 65; Pruzan, supra note 5, at 733-34; Comment,
Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 444.
179. Hirsh, supra note 9, at 147.
180. Id. at 146. See also 2 S. PEGAIS & H. WACHSmAN, supra note 2, at 221.
181. 2 S. PEGALIS & H. WACHSMAN, supra note 2, at 222.
182. Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 449.
183. Hirsh, supra note 9, at 146. For a definition of "substantial evidence" in the
context of the FDA regulatory scheme, see supra notes 36-39 and accompany-
ing text. See also Mueller v. Mueller, 88 S.D. 446, 452, 221 N.W.2d 39, 42-43
(1974) (The court acknowledged that before a drug is allowed on the market,
it is put to stringent tests as to its usefulness and possible side effects.).
184. See supra notes 33-48 and accompanying text. "It must be presumed that the
medical profession recognizes the [FDA] as a standard authority with re-
spect to its regulation of warnings that accompany medication." Cornfeldt v.
Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 703 (Minn. 1977).
185. Mueller v. Mueller, 88 S.D. 446, 452, 221 N.W.2d 39, 43 (1974). In Mueller, the
court stated that "[n]o one would expect [the busy doctor] to stop his prac-
tice and conduct tests and experiments so that he could prescribe the drug
solely from his own independent findings on its usefulness and possible side
effects." Id. at 452, 221 N.W.2d at 43.
186. Chrestman v. Kendall, 247 Ark. 802, 809, 448 S.W.2d 22, 26 (1969), Mulder v.
Parke Davis & Co., 288 Minn. 332, 338, 181 N.W.2d 882, 887 (1970); Mueller v.
Mueller, 88 S.D. 446, 452-53, 221 N.W.2d 39, 43 (1974) (every doctor who testi-
fied admitted to using the PDR as a guide in prescribing drugs).
187. Julien v. Barker, 75 Idaho 413, 423, 272 P.2d 718, 724 (1954). See also Cornfeldt
v. Tongen, 262 N.W.2d 684, 703 (Minn. 1977); Mulder v. Parke Davis & Co., 288
Minn. 332, 338, 181 N.W.2d 882, 887 (1970).
1984]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
the drug is considered safe only if used as directed. 88 More drug
injuries will certainly occur if the warnings are disregarded.189
The medical profession's contention that the package inserts are
quickly outdated, should be given little weight, in light of the man-
ufacturer's continuing duty to warn under FDA regulations.190
Furthermore, drug manufacturers have an added incentive to up-
date inserts since compliance with the FDA requirements is
viewed by the courts as only a minimal standard.19' The manufac-
turer must provide all necessary information for safe drug usage in
order to avoid civil liability.192
The medical profession cannot overlook its obligation to keep
informed.193 Judicial recognition of the drug manufacturer's rec-
ommendations will provide a needed incentive for doctors to be-
come fully informed about a drug before they administer it.194 "It
is important that there should be no relaxation of incentives for
the physician to make use of the added information that manufac-
turers might be induced to provide."' 95 Indeed, the Federal Com-
mission on Medical Malpractice recognizes the need for the
medical profession to become more proficient in handling prescrip-
tion drugs.196
VI. CONCLUSION
The judiciary should recognize the drug manufacturer's recom-
mendations as the best source of information on proper drug usage
and admit the package insert, if relevant, as an exception to the
rule against hearsay.197 The exception to the hearsay rule is justi-
fied by necessity and the trustworthiness of the drug manufac-
188. Mueller v. Mueller, 88 S.D. 446, 452, 221 N.W.2d 39, 42 (1974).
189. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
191. Pruzan, supra note 5, at 717.
192. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. See also Julien v. Barker, 75
Idaho 413, 423, 272 P.2d 718, 724 (1954) ("[The drug manufacturer] bears the
same liability for damages to users of this product that manufacturers gener-
ally bear for ... failure to warn against danger involved in the use of the
product.").
193. Comment, supra note 85, at 491.
194. Merrill, supra note 3, at 90.
195. Id. at 110.
196. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMM'N, supra note 1, at 60. The Recommenda-
tion of the Commission was that "clinical pharmacology... be required as
part of an integrated program for teaching the basics of therapeutics to all
medical and nursing students and that similar attention be given to the same
subjects in post-graduate and continuing medical education curricula." Id.
The Commission noted that the study of clinical pharmacology was elective
in some medical schools. Id.
197. ' his is but another example of accepting the scientific process in the search
for truth instead of reliance upon the efficacy of an oath as a guaranty of
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turer's recommendations, as supervised by the FDA. Although the
package insert is currently considered a member of the medical
treatise family, the courts should treat the insert as a separate spe-
cies in their evidentiary rulings.
[Drug manufacturers' recommendations] are not only admissible but es-
sential in determining the possible lack of care of a doctor where the issue
involved is injury from the administration of a drug. We see no reason for
the courts to hesitate to use a standard so widely and favorably used in the
medical profession.19 8
If the package insert is admissible on the issue of the proper
standard of care, and the facts of the case and the manufacturer's
recommendation fall within the common knowledge of the jury,199
the physician's departure from the clear and explicit warnings or
instructions of the drug manufacturer should establish the plain-
tiff's prima facie case, providing the departure caused the plain-
tiff's injuries. Any further requirement of expert testimony to
establish customary administration or prescription of a drug would
be mere surplusage.2 00 When a physician deviates from express
warnings that even the jury can understand, he should be required
to explain the reasons for his actions, and the physician should not
be allowed to hide behind the protective shield of the hearsay rule.
Moreover, the "common knowledge" restriction on the use of the
drug manufacturer's recommendations to establish the medical
standard of care and its breach will preserve the doctor's in-
dependent judgment and check the discretion of the jury, while
still encouraging sound medical practice and protecting the pa-
tient's right to non-negligent treatment in the use of prescription
drugs. 201
trustworthiness." Lewandowski v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins., 33 Wis. 2d 69, 76-
77, 146 N.W.2d 505, 509 (1966).
198. Mueller v. Mueller, 88 S.D. 446, 453, 221 N.W.2d 39, 43 (1974) (emphasis
added).
199. In cases involving injuries from prescription drugs, the most likely area to fall
within the jury's common knowledge might be a doctor's failure to get the
informed consent; this is when the doctor fails to describe either a material
risk or a material side effect explained in the package insert prior to the ad-
ministration of the drug. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
200. Comment, Package Inserts as Evidence, supra note 33, at 438.
201. Id. at 433, 450.
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